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Prolonging	the	acquis	is	a	blueprint	for	the	Brexit
transition
In	a	report	published	in	late	2017,	Piet	Eeckhout	and	Oliver	Patel	assess	the	options	for	a
Brexit	transitional	arrangement.	They	argue	that	the	most	realistic	option	is	for	the	full	body
of	EU	law	to	continue	to	apply	in	the	UK,	while	the	UK	simultaneously	ceases	to	be	an	EU
member	state.	Their	insights	serve	as	a	good	explanation	of	the	recent	row	over	EU
citizens’	residency	rights	once	the	transition	period	beings.	
The	blueprint	for	a	transition	period	that	we	advocate	as	the	most	viable	is	where	the	UK	gives	up	its	membership	but
accepts	EU	laws	lock,	stock	and	barrel.	In	her	Florence	speech,	Thersa	May	made	clear	that	the	UK	seeks	a
transition	where	‘access	to	one	another’s	markets	should	continue	on	current	terms’,	i.e.	nothing	changes.	She	even
accepted	that	the	framework	for	this	period	would	be	‘the	existing	structure	of	EU	rules	and	regulations’,	with	David
Davis	confirming	in	his	speech	in	late	2017		to	German	business	leaders	that	the	UK	wants	to	remain	in	all	EU
regulatory	agencies	during	the	transition.	Similarly,	the	EU	has	also	indicated	that	it	would	accept	a	status	quo
transition,	but	this	would	require	‘existing	union	regulatory,	budgetary,	supervisory,	judiciary	and	enforcement
instruments	and	structures	to	apply’.
An	extension	of	the	EU	acquis	communautaire	(the	full	body	of	EU	law)	to	the	UK,	while	the	UK	simultaneously
ceases	to	be	an	EU	member	state,	is	the	obvious	choice	for	the	post-Brexit	transition.	This	is	for	three	reasons.	First,
it’s	comprehensive,	meaning	that	very	little	changes	on	Brexit	day,	and	a	cliff-edge	is	avoided.	Second,	it’s	relatively
straightforward	from	a	legal	perspective,	at	least	compared	with	the	other	options.	The	Article	50	withdrawal
agreement	could	be	the	legal	basis,	meaning	it	would	require	approval	only	from	a	qualified	majority	of	the	European
Council	and	the	European	Parliament,	but	not	member	state	parliaments.	It’s	simpler	than	the	UK	re-joining	the	EEA
Agreement	via	EFTA	or	crafting	an	EEA	copycat	agreement.	The	former	would	require	treaty	amendment	and	the
approval	of	member	state	parliaments,	while	the	latter	would	require	bespoke	institutional	mechanisms	for	dispute
settlement	and	enforcement	to	be	set	up.	Third	–	and	perhaps	most	importantly	–	it’s	politically	feasible.
Of	course,	there	would	be	bitter	pills	to	swallow.	What’s	the	point	of	leaving	the	EU	if	nothing	changes	aside	from
losing	your	seat	at	the	table?	However,	May	has	already	accepted	free	movement,	budgetary	contributions	and	a
role	for	the	European	court	of	justice	(ECJ)	in	the	transition,	and	the	government	recognises	that	wasting	time
negotiating	a	bespoke	transition	is	futile	when	the	future	relationship	is	the	big	prize.	Why	fill	yourself	up	on	the
starter	when	the	main	course	is	still	to	come?
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What	would	an	extension	of	the	EU	acquis,	without	membership,	actually	mean?	First,	the	whole	body	of	EU	law
would	continue	to	apply	in	the	UK	post-Brexit,	meaning	cooperation	in	many	areas,	such	as	trade	and	security,	could
carry	on	unchanged.	Second,	the	UK	would	continue	to	accept	the	burdens	and	obligations	of	membership,	despite
losing	its	representation	in	the	EU	institutions.	Third,	it	would	enable	the	UK	and	the	EU	to	continue	sorting	out	their
future	relationship	after	withdrawal,	with	minimal	disruption.
However,	there	would	be	challenges,	and	the	thorny	legal	and	political	issues	cannot	be	underestimated.	For
example,	the	EU	would	insist	on	ECJ	jurisdiction	continuing,	and	the	legal	principles	of	supremacy	and	direct	effect
being	upheld.	Due	to	the	principle	of	the	autonomy	of	EU	law,	well	established	in	ECJ	case	law,	the	EU	would	insist
that	no	other	court	have	ultimate	authority	to	interpret	EU	law.	It	would	also	not	accept	bespoke,	sectoral	carve-outs
in	areas	like	fisheries	and	agriculture	–	much	to	Michael	Gove’s	dismay	–	due	to	the	interwoven	and	cross-cutting
nature	of	EU	law.		EU	law	is	an	integrated	system,	with	all	kinds	of	connections	between	its	parts.	Take	fisheries,	for
example.	If	fisheries	policy	is	excluded	but	environmental	policy	is	not,	there	will	then	be	a	need	to	identify,
specifically,	which	legislative	cross	references	which	no	longer	work,	and	this	will	entail	detailed	scrutiny	and	political
disagreement.	Finally,	the	issue	of	the	UK’s	status	vis-a-vis	the	EU’s	international	agreements	with	third	parties,
including	a	whole	series	of	international	treaties	and	free	trade	agreements	(FTA)	would	remain	unresolved.	Take	the
example	of	the	EU-South	Korea	FTA.	Once	the	UK	is	no	longer	a	member	state,	that	FTA	cannot	continue	to	apply
to	UK-South	Korea	trade	relations	without	some	kind	of	negotiation	and	update.	The	reason	is	that	the	FTA	is	defined
as	applying,	on	the	EU	side,	in	the	territories	of	the	EU	member	states.	Nor	can	the	withdrawal	agreement	fix	this,	as
South	Korea	is	not	a	party	to	it.
Despite	this,	an	extension	of	the	EU	acquis,	without	membership,	is	much	easier	to	sort	out,	both	legally	and
politically,	than	every	conceivable	alternative	transitional	option	(except,	perhaps,	extending	Article	50),	and	the	two
sides	already	agree	on	the	fundamentals.
It	must	be	stressed	that	this	status	quo	transitional	arrangement,	desirable	as	it	may	be,	does	not	resolve	the
fundamental	issues	of	Brexit.	One	day,	the	UK	will	have	to	choose	what	it	wants:	sovereignty	or	market	access.	Also,
it	doesn’t	prevent	there	from	being	a	cliff-edge	at	the	end	of	the	transition,	especially	if	it’s	only	a	couple	of	years
long.	(An	indefinite	transition	is	desirable	but	politically	implausible;	an	easily	extendable	deal	would	do	the	trick).
However,	it	buys	time	–	an	invaluable	resource	when	the	clock	is	ticking.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	A	shorter	version	of	this
blog	originally	appeared	in	The	Guardian	and	The	Constitution	Unit.	Piet	Eeckhout	and	Oliver	Patel’s	full
report,	Brexit	Transitional	Arrangements:	Legal	and	Political	Considerations,	can	be	accessed	here.	
Piet	Eeckhout	is	Professor	of	EU	Law,	Dean	of	UCL	Laws	and	the	Director	of	the	UCL	European	Institute.
Oliver	Patel	is	a	Research	Associate	at	the	UCL	European	Institute.
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